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Summary 
In 2005-2006 China reformed its stock market by eliminating non-tradable shares. The 
regulator set general guidelines and then assigned responsibility for implementation to each 
company. We derive relations that should have been followed by the prices of stocks and 
exploit a company-level data set to compare the actual and the theoretical price reactions. 
We find evidence for abnormal returns both before the beginning of the reform and during 
the reform. Cross-sectionally, abnormal returns are associated mainly with turnover and 
compensation. This shows that in a speculative market, investors do not properly react to 
unambiguous corporate actions. 
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Stock Prices in a Speculative Market:  








In 2005-2006 China reformed its stock market by eliminating non-tradable shares. The regulator set 
general guidelines and then assigned responsibility for implementation to each company. We derive 
relations that should have been followed by the prices of stocks and exploit a company-level data 
set to compare the actual and the theoretical price reactions. We find evidence for abnormal returns 
both before the beginning of the reform and during the reform. Cross-sectionally, abnormal returns 
are associated mainly with turnover and compensation. This shows that in a speculative market, 
investors do not properly react to unambiguous corporate actions. 
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I. Introduction 
In efficient markets, stock prices are the present discounted value of fundamentals. Efficient 
markets signal the relative scarcity of capital, so investors can react to prices and allocate resources 
to the most productive and desirable uses. However, speculation may spoil the link between prices 
and fundamentals. Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2004) show 
that the combination of heterogeneous beliefs and short sale constraints may induce investors to 
overpay for a stock if they expect to sell it to another investor with an even larger willingness to pay 
in the future. In order to be tested, this model needs an estimate of the speculative component of the 
price, either at the aggregate level or at the level of the single stock. Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2005) use a panel of 73 Chinese stocks with multiple trading classes. By assuming that one class is 
fairly  priced,  they  find  that  stocks  with  larger  overvaluation  are  also  characterized  by  larger 
turnover. 
Speculation is closely linked with sentiment. Baker  and Wurgler (2006) write that  “one 
possible definition of investor sentiment is the propensity to speculate”. They notice that shifts in 
sentiment may carry cross-sectional implications either because some stocks are harder to evaluate 
in  an  objective  way  or  because  arbitrage  is  more  difficult.  Baker  and  Wurgler  (2006)  build  a 
monthly  sentiment  index  and  show  that  the  cross-section  of  subsequent  returns  may  be 
meaningfully conditioned on such a variable. Their interpretation is that markets can make mistakes 
in  relative  pricing  which  depend  on  the  overall  level  of  speculative  activity.  This  result  raises 
several issues about testing of models with data generated by regimes characterized by different 
degrees of efficiency.  
We study the relation between speculation and pricing, exploiting a new data set about the 
Chinese stock market, whose investors are widely regarded as being very speculative, see Mei, 
Scheinkman  and  Xiong  (2006).  Analyses  of  Chinese  markets  are  therefore  very  relevant  to 
understand  asset  pricing  with  speculation.  Do  speculative  investors  misinterpret  the  pricing 
consequences  of  even  simple  company  actions?  In  2005-2006,  Chinese  regulators  decided  to   3 
eliminate the class of non-tradable shares (NTS), that could not be freely traded on the local stock 
markets. This reform was achieved through a process by which holders of NTS paid compensation 
to holders of tradable shares (TS)
1 in exchange for the right to sell their shares in the future. After 
successful initial experiments with a small number of firms, in August 2005 Chinese authorities 
publicly declared extension of the process to all companies traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
markets, and set the end of 2006 as a deadline for the completion of the reform. Each company 
joining the  reform had  to respect a schedule implying two trading suspensions and subsequent 
readmissions. We carry out an event study
2 and measure the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks 
as well as variables like volume and volatility, which, in some models, for example Baker and Stein 
(2004) and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), are linked to irrational traders and speculative 
activity. We finally carry out cross sectional analyses connecting price changes, volume, volatility 
and other relevant variables.  
Our main findings are as follows. Risk-adjusted stock prices increase both before the first 
suspension and in the period following the first readmission. Volume increases substantially in all 
the event periods, with a particularly strong rise after the second readmission. Prices fall after the 
end of the reform. Cross-sectionally, prices react to the surprise in the compensation assigned to the 
holders  of  the  TS,  to  variables  that  proxy  the  governance  structure  and  the  quality  of  various 
companies, as well as to volume and volatility. We show that the price increase before the first 
suspension is unlikely to be generated by a risk premium and claim that our findings are coherent 
                                                 
1 Such compensation is consistent with the idea that the transformation of NTS into TS may damage 
the current holders of TS, who in the past decided to hold shares under the assumption that NTS 
would have never been turned into TS, see Chen and Xiong (2001) 
2 The results of several event studies have been interpreted as producing “anomalies”, especially in 
the long-term reactions of prices. Fama (1998) disputes the robustness of long-term return event 
studies, but recognizes the usefulness of short-term return event studies. 
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with speculation driving portfolio choices of investors. Our results are generally coherent with the 
hypothesis that in a speculative market, investors may not correctly price simple corporate actions. 
Our paper is different from previous studies. Neither we study the relation between bubbles 
and speculation, as done by Mei, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), nor we consider the cross section 
of stock returns from a predictive point of view, as done by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Instead, we 
consider  company-specific  event  windows,  involving  periods  of  trading  and  non-trading,  and 
examine whether the reaction of prices to well-identified announcements and corporate actions is 
compatible with market efficiency. This is a useful addition to the literature because we exploit 
corporate actions whose effects on stock prices should be unambiguous. From a methodological 
point of view, our contribution is the introduction of a bootstrap procedure that is designed to 
replicate the actual degree of covariance across firms when doing statistical tests on cumulative 
average abnormal returns. 
We are aware of several other papers studying this reform. Lu, Balatbat and Czernkowski 
(2008) examine the reaction of prices both to the general announcement of the reform and to the 
company-specific  announcements  with  particular  regard  to  compensation  characteristics  for  a 
sample of firms. Li, Wang, Cheung and Jiang (2007) study the reform on the basis of a general 
equilibrium  model  explaining  compensation  on  the  basis  of  company  and  shareholders 
characteristics; Haveman and Wang (2008) also discuss the struggle among different shareholders. 
Liao, Li, Liu and Wang (2008) study what happens to prices on the day of the lockup expiration. 
Our paper is different: we study all Chinese stocks and consider all the different phases of the 
reform. Moreover we interpret the data as relevant to the study of asset pricing in a speculative 
market. 
After this introduction, the plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the Chinese 
stock market, both from the point of view of the papers which are more relevant to our research and 
from an institutional point of view. The section moreover contains  a  description of the reform 
process and of the mechanics by which firms compensate shareholders. Section III discusses the   5 
theoretical background. Section IV describes methodological issues, the structure of the event study 
and the empirical results. Section V concludes. 
 
II. The reform of the Chinese dual-share structure 
Chinese firms typically issue multiple classes of shares. The existence of multiple classes of 
shares (A-shares, B-shares, overseas listed shares, legal-person shares, State shares) can be traced 
back to the restructuring of State-owned enterprises (SOEs) taking place in the 1990s and to the 
interest on the part of the State not to totally relinquish control of firms. A-shares could be traded 
only by domestic investors until 2003. Since that date the possibility of trading domestic renminbi-
denominated securities has been extended to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) but 
only up to a value of 5.65 billion dollars, about 1% of the stock market capitalization. B-shares are 
denominated in foreign currencies and until February 2001 were reserved to foreign investors
3. 
Overseas listed shares are issued by Chinese companies on securities markets outside mainland 
China (H-shares, for those listed in Hong Kong, N-shares listed in New York, L-shares listed in 
London and S-shares listed in Singapore). Legal-person shares have been given, in the restructuring 
process of State-owned enterprises (SOEs), to domestic institutions, most of which are partially 
owned by the central or local government. State shares are owned by the State Council. Legal-
person shares and State shares are together known as nontradeable shares. At the beginning of 2006, 
NTS  accounted  for  about  63%  of  the  total  number  of  shares  outstanding.  NTS  have  the  same 
cashflow and voting rights as TS. 
Transfer  of  NTS  has  become  possible  since  mid  1990s  through  irregularly  scheduled 
auctions and over-the-counter transactions. According to Green and Black’s (2003) analysis of 840 
                                                 
3 Chinese investors have to use the foreign exchange reserve in their banking accounts to buy B-
shares. Overall, the market capitalization of B-shares was about 3% of the capitalization of A-shares 
in 2005 
   6 
transactions taking place in the Shenzhen market in the period 1994-2003, such transfers have often 
involved  large  blocks  affecting  the  control  of  companies.  The  dominant  sellers  were  State-
controlled shareholding companies, and the dominant buyers were private companies. 32% (46%) 
of the deals were associated with a change in control in 2001 (2002). Chen and Xiong (2001) find a 
large discount (price of NTS as a ratio of the price of TS) averaging about 80%. The discount is 
lower for large firms, firms with a high return on equity, firms with high earnings-price or book-
price ratios, firms with low debt-equity ratios, firms with low stock return volatility. 
On April 29, 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced a pilot 
program to transform NTS into TS. In Its final version, the reform involves two suspension periods 
for each company. During the first suspension period holders of NTS discuss the compensation 
proposal to be submitted to the holders of TS. The company then publishes a notice to provide full 
details of the proposal to shareholders. Once the shares resume trading, no further revisions can be 
made to the proposal to be submitted for shareholders approval. After this first suspension period, 
the  shares  are  then  suspended  for  a  second  time  after  the  closing  date  of  registration  for 
participation in shareholders’ meeting. Trading is resumed again after the meeting that ratifies the 
completion  of  the  reform  process  and  at  the  same  time  the  compensation  is  paid.  The  reform 
proposal is approved if (a) at least two-thirds of the votes totally cast by holders of NTS and holders 
of  A-shares  are  in  favor  (b)  at  least  two-thirds  of  the  vote  cast  by  holders  of  A-shares  who 
participate in the meeting are in favor. 
Compensation to holders of TS can be paid through various channels: (a) new shares can be 
offered directly by holders of NTS to holders of TS (b) new shares may be offered by the company 
to holders of both TS and NTS (c) holders of NTS may cancel part of their shares (d) holders of TS 
may  be  offered  compensation  in  cash  or  a  certain  assignment  of  warrants.  Offers  are  usually 
expressed as a percentage of 10 TS originally held. The typical case (79.1% of the cases) involves a 
direct transfer of currently NTS to holders of TS. On average holders of TS get 3.12 shares every 10 
shares  originally  held.  The  second  most  popular  method  (8.9%)  involves  new  issues  that  are   7 
assigned only to holders of TS. In this case holders of TS get on average 5.90 shares every 10 
shares originally held.  
Companies undergo the reform in various batches
4. The first batch included four companies. 
On June 17, 2005, the CSRC initiated the second round of the program, involving 42 companies. 
On  August  19,  this  second  round  was  accomplished.  On  August  24,  the  government  issued 
guidelines to extend the reform project to the rest of the stock market, setting a deadline for the end 
of 2006. Figure 1 shows the timing of the various batches as well as the number of companies 
included in each batch and highlights that they have been rather regular both in terms of timing (2-3 
batches every month) and in terms of number of companies (about twenty in each batch)
5 since 
October 2005. On February 2007, 1.301 listed companies had either completed or initiated their 
NTS reform process. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
                                                 
4  See  Wan,  Yuan  and  Ha  (2005),  Inoue  (2005)  and  Jingu  (2006)  for  detailed  accounts  of  the 
institutional aspects of the reform process. 
5 In order to provide further incentives for companies to join the reform, the CSRC stated that 
reform-compliant companies would be given priority to raise new capital (new issues of shares and 
IPOs had been frozen since April 2005). To facilitate the reform, the Chinese government has also 
taken  a  series  of  measures  to  help  stabilize  the  stock  market.  The  legislative  department  also 
amended the Company Law and the Securities Law to perfect the legal framework concerning the 
capital market. At the end of January, 2006, there was a further rule change making it easier for 
strategic investors to buy stakes in listed companies; under the new rules the purchase of A-shares is 
not reserved anymore to the small group of qualified investors but is extended to all the investors 
willing to buy a minimum stake of 10% of the company and hold the shares for longer than three 
years. 
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III. Theoretical price movements without speculation 
In order to understand the pricing implications of the reform it is useful to analyze the 
sequence  of  events  at  the  level  of  the  single  firm.  Consider  a  simple  case  where,  before  the 
beginning of the reform, there are 10 TS with a market price of 1 and 20 NTS with a market price of 
0.65.  Total  market  value  is  equal  to  23.  Assume  that  there  is  an  announcement  that  NTS  will 
become tradable in the future and that no compensation will be paid to holders of TS. Also assume 
that  the  demand  curve  is  horizontal,  expectations  of  fundamentals  are  not  changed  by  the 
announcement and there is no discounting. It follows that the new price of NTS should be equal to 
the price of TS due to disappearance of the illiquidity discount. Longstaff (2001) shows how large 
the price discount may be even in a rational market. The market value of the company immediately 
increases to 30. Assume now that the announcement also states that compensation will involve a 
transfer of 3 NTS to holders of TS. To allow for compensation, the price of each TS should be equal 
to 13/10 and the price of each NTS should be equal to 17/20. Before compensation is paid, wealth 
of both shareholders increases. After compensation is paid, prices readjust to 1, holders of TS have 
a total wealth of 13 and holders of NTS have a total wealth of 17. Compensation is equivalent to a 
split from the point of view of holders of TS: they had 10 TS at a unitary price of 13/10 before 
compensation payment, and they have 13 shares at a unitary price of 1 after the payment.  
Consider  now  a  stylized  description  of  the  reform  that  is  representative  of  the  true 
mechanism: (i) the initial announcement takes place at time 0, (ii) trading is suspended at time 1, 
(iii) at time 2 the company is readmitted to trading, contemporaneously to an announcement about 
the size of the compensation, (iv) the company is again suspended from trading at time 3, (v) the 
compensation is paid and the company is readmitted to trading at time 4. The path of rational prices 
of TS should be the following: (i) prices react to expected compensation as well as to expected 
changes in fundamentals at time 0, perhaps allowing for an expected supply effect; (ii) between 
time 0 and time 1, prices react to revisions in expectations of compensation and other fundamentals. 
Prices have a positive drift to remunerate the compensation risk premium. (iii) At time 2 prices   9 
react to any compensation surprise. (iv) Nothing happens between time 2 and time 3 as no new 
information is released and there is no more risk. In principle, there is some risk between the day of 
the public announcement of the compensation and the day when the shareholders meet to formally 
approve the reform package. However in practice there was no example of shareholders rejecting 
the proposal. This can be explained on the basis of the high costs of not accepting a proposal that 
had been discussed and informally approved during the first suspension period. (v) Prices drop by 
the amount of compensation at time 4. In the literature the split is considered to be a signal of 
insider information on the part of the managers see McNichols and Dravid (1990). Coherently with 
the signaling hypothesis, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) show that positive abnormal returns after a 
split are consistent with a positive revision of corporate profitability on the part of investors. In the 
Chinese case however the split is forced by the reform process and it is unlikely that managers have 
used it to provide specific information.  
 
IV. Empirical analysis 
A. Methodological issues 
The event study uses the residuals from a pricing model. The pricing model is estimated using 
observations between ti-120 and ti-10
6, where ti is the day of the first suspension for stock i. The 
estimated parameters are used to compute the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in the event 
windows. In what follows we will consider simple CAPM-adjusted returns. A final section will deal 
with robustness analysis, allowing for estimation of multi-factor models. For all event windows, 
cumulative  abnormal  returns  are  averaged  across  companies  to  obtain  the  mean  cumulative 
abnormal residuals (MCAR).  
                                                 
6 We have also experimented with other estimation periods like t-150/t-10  and t-90/t-10 but results 
are not affected. 
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We measure the variance of MCAR in three ways. Following Campbell, Lo and MacKinaly 
(1997), under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms, the 
variance of the MCAR is: 
(1)                                                        ∑ =
- =
N
i i T V N MCAR Var
1
2 ) ( ;                                                    
where: 
(2)                                                 ( )i X X X X I i V i i i i i i i
*' 1 ' * 2 2 ) ( '
- + = e e s s ;         
is the variance of the i-th company (composed of a first term that accounts for the variance of 
abnormal returns and a second term that allows for estimation error),  i X  (
*
i X ) is the matrix of 
regressors used in the estimation period (the event window) and i is a vector of ones. In what 
follows we define this variance estimate as CLM variance. The null hypothesis of no abnormal 
returns is tested by means of the statistic: 






J = ;                                                              
which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal. The disadvantage of this estimator lies in 
its assuming independence of residuals across firms. Our event periods are sometimes overlapping 
across  firms  because  the  latter  are  divided  in  batches  of  companies  going  through  the  reform 
process over similar time frames. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) discuss inference in event 
windows with clustering and notice that standard methods suffer from lack of power. We therefore 
compute two other estimators. 
The second estimator is the cross-sectional variance (CS variance) across mean cumulative 
and  average  abnormal  returns  of  the  different  companies,  see  Asquith  (1983)  and  Lynch  and 
Mendenhall (1997). Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) point out that the use of the CS variance 
is justified under the weaker assumption of cross sectionally uncorrelated residuals. Brown and 
Warner (1985) moreover point out that the CS variance is robust to the possibility of increases in 
the variance of the securities during the event periods.    11 
The  third  estimator  is  obtained  by  bootstrapping  abnormal  returns  in  such  a  way  as  to 
preserve their cross-correlation properties. For all the companies involved in the reform process we 
estimate  a  market  model  over  a  common  estimation  period  (bootstrap  estimation  period).  The 
bootstrap estimation period includes 140 observations prior to September 16, 2004
6. Estimation of 
the market model over the same period allows us to retrieve a matrix of residuals respecting typical 
covariation across stocks in a period without any reform.  
Denote with 




i b a  (for companies i=1,2…N) the parameters estimated over the bootstrap 
estimation period: 




i t i t i r b a r ar ,
) ( ) (
, , - - = .                                                      
In order to describe our bootstrap assume that there are only three firms, A, B and C, which 
are readmitted to trading respectively on January 10, January 15 and March 5 of the year 2006. In 
the event study we analyze their cumulative average abnormal returns respectively over the periods 
January 10-January 20, January 15-January 25 and March 5-March 15. Firms A and B have a five 
day overlap. Suppose we have estimated a market model for these three companies using data for 
the year 2005. We extract a (randomly selected) block of 10 consecutive observations from the 
cumulative abnormal residuals of stock A over the year 2005. We do that by randomly selecting a 
number between 1 and 241, say number k, from a uniform distribution and by considering the 
sequence of 10 residuals between k and k+9, selected from the bootstrap estimation period. In order 
to respect the cross sectional dependence between companies A and B we then consider a sequence 
of 10 residuals for firm B between k+5 and k+14. In such a way there is a five day overlap in the 
bootstrapped residuals, corresponding to the overlap that takes place among the residuals in the 
event  windows.  As  to  firm  C,  we  consider  10  residuals  from  the  bootstrap  estimation  period 
between  j  and  j+9,  where  j  is  another  number  randomly  extracted  from  a  uniform  distribution 
between 1 and 241 (excluding k, k+14), because there is no cross correlation to account for. We 
now have three artificial time series of abnormal residuals for the three stocks, allowing for cross   12 
sectional covariance among them. We repeat the procedure for all the firms and obtain a simulated 
series of abnormal returns under the null hypothesis. We repeat the procedure 1,000 times and 
compute  an  empirical  distribution  of  mean  cumulative  and  average  residuals.  The  comparison 
between the empirical distribution and the actual value of the tests is used for statistical inference. 
We  also  apply  the  same  bootstrap  methodology  for  our  statistical  inference  regarding 
volume and volatility. It is important to allow for cross correlations across stocks also for those 
variables, whose distributions are moreover empirically highly non-normal. 
 
B. Data and summary statistics 
We have used three data sets for our empirical work: DataStream, data from Shenzhen GTA 
Information  Technology  Co  Limited  and  data  kindly  provided  by  Nomura  Institute  of  Capital 
Market Research. We cannot use the original sample of 1,440 companies for various reasons: (a) 62 
companies disappear before the beginning of the reform process, (b) according to DataStream, 17 
companies  are  suspended  from  trading  as  of  February  2007  for  unspecified  reasons,  (c)  26 
companies are born after September 2005, (d) 5 companies did not have NTS before the beginning 
of the reform process. This leaves us with a sample of 1,330 companies. 1,301 of these have entered 
the reform process and 1,192 have finished the reform by February, 2007. This sample is again 
reduced: in 94 cases we have had problems in pricing the compensation paid to shareholders and in 
other 91 cases the data are not fully convincing because of discrepancies across data sets in the 
percentage of TS before and after the reform. Excluding these 185 companies leaves us with a 
sample of 1,007 completing the reform process within February 2007. 
To  correct  for  payment  of  the  compensation  we  assume  that  total  wealth  of  tradeable 
shareholders does not change when the compensation is paid, i.e. 
(5)                                         [ ] CASH QTS SH QTS QTS p QTS p ´ + ´ + = 1 0 ,  
where  0 p  is the price before the compensation payment,  1 p  is the price after the payment, QTS is 
the number of TS outstanding at the beginning of the reform process, SH is the number of shares   13 
that are transferred to holders of TS and CASH is the cash compensation. This is not inconsistent 
with compensation-induced increase in wealth of holders of TS. However such a wealth increase 
takes  place  when  market  prices  incorporate  the  compensation  after  the  formal  announcement, 
several days before the moment of the second readmission. Few companies have paid compensation 
by assigning warrants. We have computed the theoretical price of the warrants on the basis of the 
methodology proposed by Galai and Schneller (1978). 
 
C. Qualitative characteristics of companies in the various batches of the reform 
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for ten groups of companies going through the 
reform process, roughly corresponding to company deciles.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
The first group includes 6 batches (first row of the table) and 120 companies (second row), the 
second group includes 7 batches and 130 companies, and so on. From now on we will refer to these 
as  deciles.  Batches  usually  include  a  substantial  number  of  companies,  except  for  the  first 
experimental batch, which only included 3 companies, and the last batches of our sample, including 
several companies that had not completed the reform by February 2007. As figure 1 shows, the 
reform process has been going on more or less continuously for the period under consideration. 
Row three reports the length of the first suspension, a crucial period because shareholders have to 
agree on the compensation. The increasing length may be the signal of a more problematic process 
of reaching a consensus among different classes of shareholders. 
We analyze several characteristics of the different batches and present them in the remaining 
rows  of  the  table.  First,  some  information  about  the  governance  structure  (rows  4-6).  The 
percentage  of  legal  shares  decreases  almost  monotonically  across  batches.  Given  evidence  of 
positive correlation between legal shares and firm productivity, see e.g. Sun and Tong (2003), this 
raises the possibility that the government has tried to start the reform with better quality companies. 
The percentage of TS does not show much relation with the batches. More revealing is the analysis   14 
of compensation characteristics, i.e. the percentage of TS assigned to holders of NTS. The average 
compensation is large for the first six batches, then decreases slightly and stays constant for a few 
batches and then, starting from batch thirty-one, decreases steadily.  
The remaining rows provide information about economic and financial characteristics. In 
relevant cases we compute the same characteristic both before the beginning of the reform (average 
value in the year before August 2005) and during the reform period (from August 2005 until the day 
of the first suspension). Both size and the dividend ratio decrease with the batch number. The pre-
reform bid-ask spread, a rough indicator of illiquidity, increases with the batch number. We also 
compute a second illiquidity indicator, due to Amihud (2002), as the ratio between absolute returns 
and the remnimbi volume:  










This indicator also increases with the batch number. Interestingly the latter variable shows that 
illiquidity differentials among companies belonging to early and late batches are very large before 
the reform but decrease substantially after the reform. This is coherent with the reform having a 
positive impact on liquidity. 
The price range (the difference between the maximum and minimum price on a given day) 
slightly  increases  across  batches.  Most  of  all,  volatility  decreases  during  the  reform.  Turnover 
increases during the reform. 
 
D. Price reactions  
Figure 2 describes the price of one specific company (Baotou Huazi Intl) before, during and after 
the reform. In this example the stock price goes up before the first suspension, and again between 
the first and the second suspension.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]   15 
There is an upward jump on the day of the first readmission and a downward jump on the day of the 
second readmission. This pattern was frequent across companies.  
Table 2 and figure 3 report results of the CAR analysis for the 1,007 companies included in 
our sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
In the ten days before the first suspension abnormal prices increase by 2.20%, with a concentration 
in the three days before each announcement. The cumulative returns are statistically significant if 
evaluated by means of the t-tests but are not significant, except for the last one, if judged on the 
basis  of  the  bootstrap.  This  is  not  consistent with  the  risk  explanation,  as  one  would  expect  a 
positive risk premium to hold continuously for all the period before the first readmission. On the 
contrary, we observe significant abnormal returns only at the very end of the period. This evidence 
is more consistent with information leakage than a risk story. To evaluate this impression, in figure 
4 we also plot cumulative abnormal returns over ninety days before the suspension.  
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Ths figure confirms that there is no abnormal return except for the few days before the suspension. 
On  the  readmission  day  there  is  a  further  0.7%  abnormal  return,  associated  with  67%  of  the 
companies showing an increase in the price. 
The 0.7% readmission day abnormal return is the result of +1.9% between the closing price 
before the first suspension and the opening price on the day of the first readmissions, and -1.2% 
between the opening and the closing of the readmission day. There is therefore some overreaction at 
the  opening  price.  Moreover,  according  to  the  rules  of  stock  exchanges  in  China,  the  price 
movement of a given stock must be within the range +10% and -10%. Many stocks were indeed 
suspended on the day of their first readmission because the equilibrium price increase was larger 
than 10%. Our analysis of volume data suggests that, during the reform period, stocks that were   16 
halted did not return to trading on the same day. Suspended companies are not included in the event 
study concerning the days after the first readmission.  
After  the  initial  jump  upon  readmission,  prices  tend  to  increase  another  1.7%  in  the 
subsequent nine trading days. These abnormal returns are statistically significant. There is therefore 
no mean reversion, at least after the first readmission, but momentum. If we also consider stocks 
that were halted at readmission, then the total abnormal return at the end of this period rises to 
3.5%. The Merton (1987) effect, according to which investors limit the securities they hold in their 
portfolios to those “they are aware of”, is consistent with the evidence. Media and investors are 
likely to be particularly interested in stocks going through the reform process, particularly those that 
have been readmitted to trading after the first suspension. This may create an increase in the base of 
investors. 
On the day of payment of the compensation, the average drop is 16.7%. In subsequent cross-
sectional analyses we therefore use compensation-corrected prices, which are on average 0.35% 
higher than they were when they last traded before the second suspension. Prices then drop 0.73% 
relatively  to  the  market  in  the  ten  following  days.  The  decrease  is  significant  when  ignoring 
clustering but becomes less significant when clustering is allowed and totally insignificant when the 
bootstrap is used. Overall, not much happens after the second readmission. This is consistent with 
the split having no real effects. In the literature the split is considered to be a signal of insider 
information on the part of the managers see McNichols and Dravid (1990). In the Chinese case 
however the split is forced by the reform process and it is less likely that managers have used it to 
provide specific information. The size of the compensation was probably a better way to provide 




   17 
E. Volume and volatility 
Figure 5 reports the daily total turnover (number of shares traded on a particular day net of new 
shares paid as compensation) of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between March 2004 
and February 2007.  
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
The increase in total turnover after the beginning of the  reform is clearly visible. The average 
turnover before the reform equals 256 million units, going up to 649 million units after the reform. 
Table 3 reports the average turnover for the stocks participating in the reform process, both 
as an absolute value and as a share of market turnover.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
The average is reported before, during and after the reform process. For example, the absolute value 
of the turnover for the stocks joining the reform process one month before suspension (338 million 
units for the Shanghai market) is the simple average across stocks of the daily turnover in the four 
weeks preceding the start of the reform process. The number represents 0.10% of the total turnover 
of the market over the same period. Turnover however increases by 69% in the period after the first 
readmission (and before the second suspension) with respect to the level before the reform. The 
increase is 55% for the Shenzhen market and 78% for the two markets together. Volume increases 
by  116%  in  the  month  after  the  second  suspension  (with  respect  to  volume  before  the  first 
suspension) for each single market. 
These numbers clearly indicate an increase in trading after the reform. To study this issue in 
detail we analyze abnormal volume, using two alternative methodologies. The first follows Brav 
and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003). We define normal volume as the mean daily 
volume from day ti-120 through day ti -11 relative to the day of the first suspension. Abnormal 
volume is the percentage difference between actual volume and normal volume. To eliminate the 
effect of outliers we set observations exceeding the 99
th percentile equal to the median observation. 
Table 4 confirms the large increase in volume.    18 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 4 shows that ten days before the first suspension actual volume is 13.7% larger than normal 
volume, an increase reaching 81.5% the day before suspension. On the day of the first readmission, 
volume is 154.5% higher than normal, an increase reducing to 49.2% after 10 days. On the day of 
the second readmission volume is 522% higher than normal, an increase reducing to 160% after 10 
days
7,
 there is therefore a clear increase in volume both during and after the end of the reform.  
We  also  compute  abnormal  volume  following  Ajinkya  and  Jain  (1989)  and  Lynch  and 
Mendenhall (1997). Here volume is defined as:  
(7)                                                       [ ] [ ] it it it MV V + + = 1 log / 1 log u , 
where  it V  is money volume for stock i on day t  and  it MV  is the market value of the outstanding 
shares on stock i on day t. Abnormal volume is retrieved from the residuals of a regression of 
company volume on market volume:  
(8)                                                             it mt it e u b b u + + = 1 0 . 
The regression is estimated by means of generalized least squares
8. The coefficients of the volume 
regressions are estimated using observations between times ti-120 and ti-10, where ti is the day of 
the first suspension. The cumulative residual analysis described in table 5 shows that companies 
entering  the  reform  process  have  a  positive  abnormal  volume  in  the  period  preceding  the  first 
suspension.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
                                                 
7 We take into account the increase in the float after the second readmission. 
 
8 The equation is estimated on the basis of OLS to retrieve the residuals. The residual is then 
regressed on its own lag and the slope coefficient is used as an estimate of the AR(1) coefficient to 
transform the original data as in the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure. Finally, OLS is applied to the 
transformed data. 
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Volume keeps increasing relatively to the market in all sub-periods after the first readmission. A 
very strong volume increase takes place after the second readmission.  
We estimate volatility by using the price range, defined as the percentage spread between 
the highest and the lowest values of the stock price on any given day. The price range is a very 
efficient volatility estimator as emphasized by Alizadeh, Brandt and Diebold (2002). Moreover it 
has the advantage of providing a point estimate of volatility, contrary to what happens with the 
historical  standard  deviation,  whose  estimation  requires  a  time  series  of  observations.  Table  6 
shows that the increase in volatility is not statistically significant, except for the readmission day. 
However  the  readmission  day  is  heavily  affected  by  the  price  drop  caused  by  compensation 
payment, so that this isolated spike in volatility is due to the natural unfolding of the reform. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
F. The cross section of abnormal returns 
We perform a cross sectional analysis aimed at explaining the abnormal returns on the basis of 
several  variables:  speculation  variables  (size-corrected  turnover,  volatility,  lagged  returns), 
structural variables (earnings-to-price, size, bid-ask spread), governance variables (the percentage 
of legal shares, a dummy for B shares, percentage of TS, two concentration variables to be defined 
later),  reform-specific  variables  (a  dummy  equal  to  1  for  companies  paying  part  of  all  of  the 
compensation in cash, compensation). 
Turnover and volatility are included because HSX (2006) show that overvaluation caused by 
speculative behavior should be associated with large volume and volatility. In that model, volume is 
a reflection of differences of opinion across traders, induced by disagreement about the true value of 
the firm. Merton (1987) argues that more noticeable stocks experience price increases due to more 
investors attention and Baker and Stein (2004) relate volume to the presence of irrational investors. 
Also, the empirical literature documents the existence of several interlinkages between volume and 
returns, see e.g. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) and Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2007). In particular,   20 
Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2007) show that past returns may cause future volume. Controlling for 
lagged  returns  is  therefore  important  in  the  regressions.  Volatility  is  a  proxy  for  objective 
uncertainty about value.  
Other variables capture corporate governance. We consider the percentage of legal shares as 
a proxy for the strength of the local government. Sun and Tong (2003) notice that local government 
can play a positive role for a firm in PRC because of their limiting state predation, as opposed to 
central State ownership that does not provide incentives for managers. Their empirical analysis of 
privatization in PRC confirms that state ownership has negative impact on firm performance while 
legal-person ownership has a positive effect. Xu and Wang (1999) find a positive and significant 
correlation between profitability and the fraction of legal person shares and a negative correlation 
between labor productivity and the proportion of state shares.  
As illustrated by Li et al. (2007) and Haveman and Wang (2008) the reform process can be 
interpreted as a struggle between the different classes of shareholders. In the regressions, we control 
for the Herfindal index measuring concentration among all shareholders (this index is the sum of 
the squares of the percentages held by the various shareholders) and for the percentage of TS held 
by the largest ten shareholders. The latter variable may have ambiguous effects on stock returns. 
Haveman and Wang (2008) note that large concentration of holders of TS usually implies large 
holdings on the part of mutual funds and they conjecture that “non-tradable shareholders could have 
made side-payments to mutual-fund managers to persuade them to accept, on behalf of private 
investors, less compensation than they would otherwise have demanded”. Both Haveman and Wang 
(2008) and Firth, Lin and Zou (2009) find evidence consistent with this conjecture. 
We finally consider a dummy equal to 1 when the company has issued B shares held by 
foreign investor, which may be a proxy for good corporate governance, the compensation paid to 
holders of TS and a dummy equal to 1 when part of the compensation is paid in cash. 
All the regressions are run with dummy variables controlling for the batch the company 
belongs to. While some of these dummy variables are statistically significant, there is no clear   21 
picture emerging from the data. We therefore do not report the findings relative to these dummy 
variables, which are however available to interested readers. Table 7 shows the results.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
We run the cross section six times, to explain the change in prices over different relevant 
periods: (i) between the end of August 2005 and the initial day of suspension for each company (ii) 
ten days before the first suspension (iii) on the day of the first readmission, (iv) between the first 
readmission and the second suspension, (v) on the day of the second readmission and (vi) ten days 
after the second readmission. The returns on the two readmission days are measured in terms of 
percentage difference between the opening price of the readmission day and the last closing price 
before the suspension period. In theory one would expect all the effects to be absorbed by the 
opening price due to the information having been released well in advance of the readmission. 
However price discovery might take several hours so that it is important to evaluate robustness of 
the results to an alternative definition of returns. We therefore try an alternative specification where 
the initial return is measured in terms of the percentage difference between the closing price of the 
readmission day and the last closing price before the suspension period. The results of this second 
specification are very similar and are not reported for reasons of space.  
In the ten days before the first suspension, the only relevant variables are size and volatility, 
both  with  a  positive  coefficient.  Larger  companies  and  more  volatile  companies  earned  higher 
returns before the first suspension. It is hard to explain the positive impact of size, as one would 
expect compensation risk to be concentrated in smaller companies. Volatility may be interpreted as 
a  proxy  for  speculation,  although  it  is  also  possible  that  investors  require  compensation  for 
idiosyncratic risk. Overall it is hard to explain the cross-sectional heterogeneity in returns in the 
short period leading to the first suspension. Similar results are obtained on the basis of the analysis 
that applies to the average return between the official announcement of the extension of the reform 
to the stock market as a whole (the end of August, 2005) and the day of the first suspension. 
Importantly, size has now a negative impact, coherently with the risk-based story. The dummy for B   22 
shares has a negative and significant sign, also coherently with the risk-based story according to 
which companies with higher levels of fundamental risk obtain a larger return after the extension of 
the reform to the market as a whole. Over the longer period under consideration, companies which 
can be regarded as less risky from the point of view of relevant characteristics (large companies, 
companies also held by foreign investors, less volatile companies) offer a lower abnormal return.  
The day of the first readmission should be dominated by the compensation variables. Indeed 
the relevant variables are the dummy variable for payment of cash, the compensation variable, 
turnover, past returns (returns between the end of August 2005 and the beginning of the company-
specific reform). They all have the expected sign. The larger the compensation the larger the price 
increase, while the offer to compensate through cash was not well appreciated by investors. This 
latter result is in line with previous research of Cheng, Fung and Leung (2006) finding that stock 
dividends generate positive stock price reactions while higher non-tradable share ownership implies 
more cash dividends aimed at providing non-tradable shareholders with immediate financial gains. 
The turnover variable is also relevant with a positive sign, coherent with the idea that the larger the 
speculation the larger the price increase. Past return is negative and significant, signaling some 
mean reversion for companies with a greater price increase before the beginning of the reform at the 
company level. 
Interestingly, there is evidence of delayed effects of the same variables in the ten days after 
the first readmission, when prices seem to be determined by similar considerations. Notice that this 
cross-section has only included the companies that were not halted during the first readmission and 
the second suspension.  
The  price  change  on  the  day  of  the  second  readmission  depends  again  positively  on 
turnover. The concentration among holders of TS is positive and significant. As pointed out by the 
literature, this variable may be considered as a proxy for the presence of mutual funds in the equity 
capital of a company. The result therefore suggests that the larger the role of mutual funds relatively 
to other holders of TS, the larger the compensation-corrected price. It is hard to explain this on the   23 
basis of demand pressure, i.e. the attempt on the part of mutual funds to increase their relative 
power  by  holding  more  shares,  because  the  split  did  not  dilute  their  ownership,  that  actually 
increased relatively to holders of NTS. Volatility and past returns (in the period between the first 
readmission and the second suspension) are also significant. 
Finally,  in  the  period  following  the  second  readmission,  turnover  and  volatility  are 
significant,  as  well  as  concentration  among  shareholders  (positive),  dummy  for  B  shares  and 
earnings to price (negative). While the positive impact of turnover and volatility may be associated 
with speculation, it is hard to understand why the other characteristics should affect returns after the 
end of the reform. 
 
G. Robustness analysis 
We consider various robustness tests regarding: the definition of the market index, the risk model 
for  computing  excess  returns,  alternative  structures  for  our  bootstrap,  and  allowance  for  non-
synchronous trading.  
Our previous tests have used the Shanghai and Shenzhen market indices, depending on the 
trading location of each stock. We also compute a unique float-weighted market index to evaluate 
the sensitivity of our results to the definition of the market. This is also important in view of the 
large difference between float and capitalization caused by the existence of NTS. A capitalization 
index would include the quantity of both TS and NTS to compute the weights assigned to the 
various stocks and would provide a measure not reflecting actual market conditions. Wang and Xu 
(2004)  also  compute  a  float-weighted  market  index.  We  use  the  Shenzhen  GTA  Information 
Technology Co Limited data in order to build a float-weighted market index and float-weighted risk 
factors. In what follows we will compare summary statistics for our float-weighted market index 
with those for the Shanghai Composite Index and the Shenzhen Composite Index. Both indices are 
also weighted by float.   24 
As to risk factors, we follow Fama and French (1996), Wang and Xu (2004), Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and consider the market, a size factor, a floating ratio factor and a liquidity 
factor. Wang and Xu (2004) propose including a floating ratio portfolio as a proxy for risk of bad 
governance and expropriation of holders of TS. For each company, the floating ratio is estimated by 
the percentage of TS. Wang and Xu (2004) also suggest that book-to-market is unlikely to play an 
important pricing role because of poor accounting quality in the Chinese stock market.  
The size and floating ratio factors have been built following the methodology described by 
Fama and French (1996). At the beginning of each month, Shanghai (SSE) and Shenzhen (ZSE) 
stocks are allocated to two groups (small or big, S or B) based on whether their market value (MV) 
during the previous month is below or above the median MV for the specific market. Then the 
stocks are sorted in three float ratio groups (low, medium, or high: L, M, H) based on the bottom 30 
percent, middle 40 percent and top 30 percent of the floating ratio. Value-weighted portfolio returns 
are then computed for each portfolio. FR is the difference between the average returns of the two 
high-FR portfolios and the average returns of the two low-FR
9. Theoretically, the average return of 
FR should be negative as it represents a portfolio long good governance companies and short bad 
governance companies. However, Wang and Xu (2004) themselves find that the average return of 
FR is negative, explaining this result on the basis of the better performance offered by companies 
with  more  efficient  governance.  It  is  therefore  unclear  whether  FR  is  a  true  proxy  for  a  non-
diversificable risk factor. 
Similarly, we build a liquidity portfolio (HLIQMLLIQ) after ranking stocks on the basis of 
the liquidity indicator of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The liquidity measure for stock i in month t 
is the estimate  t i, g  from the regression: 
                                                 
9 We have followed Wang and Xu (2004) and have used the part of floating ratio that is orthogonal 
to size measured as the log of the market value. 
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(9)                                        1 , , , , , , , , , , , , 1 , ) ( + + + ´ + + = t d i t d i
e
t d i t i t d i t i t i
e
t d i v r sign r r e g f q , 
where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  excess  return  on  the  stock  on  day  d  in  month  t  and  the 
regressors are respectively the return on the stock in the previous day of the month and a variable 
obtained from the multiplication of the sign of the excess return and the volume of the stock. The 
indicator proxies liquidity by an estimate of the return reversal
10. The portfolio is long high liquidity 
stocks and short low liquidity stocks. 
Table 8 reports summary statistics about the indices and the risk factors for two sub-periods: 
1998-2005 and 2005-2007.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
The correlation between our own index and the Shanghai and Shenzhen indices are always above 
93%. There is some difference in the mean and the median returns in the first sub-period but the 
various summary statistics are almost identical in the most relevant 2005-2007 period. As a result of 
this, we do not repeat the tests. The risk factors are not very correlated among themselves. The 
largest correlation is equal to 0.491 between the size and the floating factors. Average returns are 
negative in 2005-2007. While this is inconsistent with the identification of these portfolios as risk 
factors, we notice that two years is a short sample and the actual return may well not be a good 
proxy of the expected return. In the previous sub-sample average returns are positive, except for the 
liquidity factor, that is essentially zero. The pre-after factor is strongly positive. 
Table 9 reports the event study derived from the factor model abnormal returns.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
The results are very similar to those of table 2, except that the positive cumulative abnormal returns 
are significant for the four days before the first suspension from trading and the total decrease after 
the second readmission is about half as large as the estimate we had before. Basic conclusions do 
                                                 
10 In our estimation, most of the estimated coefficients are negative, coherently with the intuitive 
meaning of the measure which associates liquidity with stock reversals. 
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not change, as a four day increase in prices is more likely to be associated with information about 
the identity of the companies to be suspended than with a risk premium. 
Table 10 reports the results of the cross sectional analysis.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
Accounting  for  systematic  risk  factors  therefore  reduces  the  cross-sectional  impacts  of  several 
variables. The main differences are the following: the B-share dummy and size are not significant 
before the first suspension. The only relevant variable is volatility. This further weakens the risk-
based story. The other main difference is that the concentration variable and the earnings to price 
lose  statistical  significance  after  the  second  readmission.  Volatility  and  turnover  are  the  only 
variables to be significant in most event periods. Compensation is very significant on the day of the 
first readmission.  
Table  11  reports  a  robustness  analysis  for  our  bootstrap  methodology.  We  alternatively 
estimate the market model using data over 140 days, 250 days and 500 days. Table 11 reports the p-
values obtained on the basis of the three procedures and shows that the results are very robust to 
alternative choices of estimation period. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
Finally, we compute our event studies on the basis of the Dimson (1979) estimator, allowing 
for non-synchronous trading through leads and lags of the market return. The results are almost 
unchanged. They are not reported here but are available upon request.  
 
V. Conclusions 
We have used evidence from a speculative market in order to analyze differences between actual 
and theoretical prices in the context of a structural reform of the Chinese stock market. The reform 
consisted of the elimination of a class of non-tradable shares, accounting for about two thirds of the 
market, and was based on a decentralized bargaining process, involving two suspensions and two 
readmissions to trading for each company. We compute abnormal returns around event dates and   27 
consider cross-sectional regressions involving variables related to speculation and fundamentals. 
We also study abnormal volume and volatility.  
Our main results are the following: (i) abnormal returns are positive both before the first 
suspension and after the first readmission. The increase in prices before the first suspension may 
have been due to a premium for the non-diversifiable compensation risk or to speculation. We are 
inclined to favor the latter explanation, because the positive cumulative abnormal returns arise only 
in the few days before the suspension and because of strong cross-sectional comovement between 
volume and abnormal returns. Positive abnormal returns cannot be justified by new information 
arising after the first readmission. One possibility is that they are due to a delayed reaction to the 
compensation surprise. This explanation would not exclude large unexploited profit opportunities. 
(ii) Prices drop after the second readmission, even though the evidence is not very strong from a 
statistical point of view. The new information seems therefore to have been incorporated completely 
during the reform, even though cross-sectionally there is still a strong link between turnover and 
returns. (iii) Volume increases to record levels during and after the reform, even accounting for the 
increase  in  the  supply  of  shares  assigned  as  compensation.  The  increase  in  turnover  raises  the 
possibility that investors particularly increase the demand for securities they were not familiar with 
before the reform. (iv) Most of the cross-section of average returns is explained by variables linked 
with speculation, especially volume, even though there is some role for variables associated with 
fundamentals  in  the  period  between  the  general  beginning  of  the  reform  and  the  first  day  of 
company-specific suspension. However this latter evidence is not robust with respect to the factors 
included in the equation for the abnormal returns. 
Overall, consistently with previous analyses of the Chinese stock market, speculation seems 
to dominate relative pricing. Moreover, speculation is, cross-sectionally, strongly associated with 
abnormal returns, also during periods that have no new information about the value of companies 
going  through  the  reform  process.  Investors  pushed  up  prices  of  companies  that  were  actively 
traded.  Furthermore,  prices  reacted  strongly  to  compensation  and  this  may  be  associated  with   28 
inefficient models for forecasting company choices. Finally, there was delayed price reaction after 
the first readmission. It is puzzling that so many inefficiencies have been found in the context of a 
widely followed structural reform. Substantial amount of money seems to have been left on the 
table during the reform of the Chinese stock market. 
Institutional  investors  in  the  Chinese  stock  market  are  small  but  not  irrelevant.  Finance 
theory says that prices are determined by marginal investors. Among the best known limitations to 
arbitrage  is  short  selling,  which  is  indeed  prohibited  in  China.  However  the  inefficiencies  we 
document cannot be explained by the impossibility to short stocks. Buying stocks of companies 
going  through  the  reform  after  their  first  readmission  would  have  been  a  very  simple  (and 
profitable) strategy, as would have been buying stocks of companies that had still to begin the 
reform process. It would be interesting in future research to look at data on the main portfolio 
holdings of Chinese mutual funds to understand whether such simple strategies were not widely 
followed by institutional investors or whether the amount of speculative money was so large to 
overwhelm the impact of rational investors.   29 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Batches 1-6 7-13 14-19 20-23 24-26 27-30 31-35 36-40 41-53 54-59
Number of Companies 120 130 123 145 121 131 131 125 121 63
Lenght of first suspension 9 9 9 11 16 16 13 12 14 16
Legal Shares % 24% 16% 12% 12% 10% 12% 8% 8% 8% 5%
Tradable Shares % 35% 35% 36% 37% 37% 38% 40% 41% 38% 39%
Compensation % 32% 29% 28% 27% 28% 29% 26% 26% 16% 11%
LnSize 6.22 6.34 6.33 6.43 6.36 6.13 6.01 6.06 5.96 5.87
Dividend 2.01 1.61 1.72 1.63 1.56 1.54 1.10 0.86 0.88 0.53
Bid/Ask (before) 0.34% 0.38% 0.38% 0.38% 0.40% 0.40% 0.41% 0.43% 0.45% 0.44%
Bid/Ask (during) 0.28% 0.34% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.38% 0.39% 0.40% 0.40% 0.40%
Illiquidity (before) 0.040 0.066 0.064 0.061 0.064 0.077 0.100 0.091 0.124 0.117
Illiquidity (during) 0.017 0.033 0.037 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.044 0.041 0.049 0.049
Price Range (before) 4.10% 3.89% 4.04% 3.88% 3.92% 4.07% 4.11% 4.21% 4.18% 4.44%
Price Range (during) 3.69% 3.82% 3.69% 3.48% 3.55% 3.56% 3.84% 4.29% 4.18% 4.45%
Turnover (before) 1.479 0.561 0.593 0.586 0.571 0.595 0.611 0.580 0.616 0.655
Turnover (during) 1.573 0.785 0.699 0.747 0.789 0.841 0.933 1.037 0.978 1.067
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics. The table contains summary statistics for ten groups of companies 
going through the reform process. Each group includes about 10% of the companies which joined 
the reform. The first row reports the number of the batches and second row reports the number of 
the companies in each deciles. Row three reports the length of the first suspension period. Rows 
four to six report information about the governance structure: the percentage of legal shares, the 
percentage of TS, average compensation. The remaining rows provide information about economic 
and financial characteristics computed both before the beginning of the reform (average value in the 
year before August 2005) and during the reform period (from August 2005 until the day of the first 
suspension). Characteristics are: size (in logarithms of market value), the dividend ratio, the bid-ask 
spread,  the  Amihud  (2002)  illiquidity  indicator,  the  price  range  (the  difference  between  the 
maximum and minimum price on a given day), and the turnover.   30 
Day MCAR
CLM 
variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     
variance      
t-stat
P-value
-10 -0.03 -0.37 -0.93 0.52 0 0.70 5.57 3.34 0.02 0 0.35 3.10 0.95 0.11
-9 0.04 0.38 0.96 0.45 1 0.52 3.43 2.11 0.15 1 -0.08 -0.61 -0.21 0.53
-8 0.22 1.64 4.35 0.35 2 0.70 3.98 2.60 0.11 2 -0.42 -2.80 -1.06 0.68
-7 0.29 1.88 5.07 0.35 3 1.03 5.28 3.48 0.07 3 -0.57 -3.41 -1.41 0.71
-6 0.31 1.83 4.86 0.37 4 1.25 6.00 3.98 0.05 4 -0.60 -3.26 -1.43 0.70
-5 0.27 1.43 3.84 0.42 5 1.43 6.49 4.47 0.03 5 -0.69 -3.48 -1.65 0.71
-4 0.44 2.20 5.81 0.38 6 1.52 6.68 4.64 0.01 6 -0.70 -3.30 -1.63 0.69
-3 0.81 3.79 9.93 0.30 7 1.66 7.10 4.98 0.01 7 -0.74 -3.26 -1.70 0.68
-2 1.39 5.77 16.09 0.10 8 1.73 7.29 5.14 0.00 8 -0.57 -2.40 -1.30 0.65
-1 2.20 8.28 24.26 0.01 9 1.76 7.29 5.19 0.00 9 -0.73 -2.90 -1.64 0.65
Before First Suspension Aftern First Suspension After Second Suspension
 
Table 2. Event Study Conducted on the Residuals from the Market Model. The table reports 
results of the mean cumulative abnormal returns for the 1,007 companies included in the sample. 
The event study is performed on the residuals from a market model. For each company i the 
model is estimated over a period including observation between ti-120 and ti -10 where ti is the 
day of the first suspension. The estimated parameters are used to compute the abnormal returns 
over the event windows: 10 days before the first suspension, 10 days after the first suspension 
and 10 days after the second suspension. Abnormal returns are summed to form cumulative 
abnormal  returns  (CAR).  CARs  are  then  averaged  across  companies  to  obtain  the  mean 
cumulative abnormal residuals (MCAR). The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested 
under the assumption of independence across abnormal residuals of different firms following 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) and under the assumption of no correlation 
across abnormal residuals (CS variance) see Asquith (1983) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997). 
The table presents the t-stat for all the procedures as well as bootstrap p-values obtained from the 
methodology described in the text. 
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Shanghai 338 0.10% 600 0.17% 78% 737 0.19% 118%
Shenzhen 320 0.16% 495 0.23% 55% 677 0.32% 111%
Total 331 0.06% 560 0.10% 69% 714 0.12% 116%
Before first suspension After first readmission After second readmission
 
Table 3. Turnover. The table reports the simple average turnover (millions of shares traded for 
a stock on a particular day) for the stocks participating in the reform process. The average is 
reported for the month before the reform process, for the period between the two suspensions and 
for the month after the reform process. The table reports the absolute value of turnover, its share 
with  respect  to  the  total  turnover  of  the  market  (Percentage)  and  its  increment  (Percentage 
change) with respect to the average value computed over the month before the first suspension.    32 
ABNORMAL 
VOLUME        
%





-10 13.7% -13.6% 0.03 0.105 41% 1007
-9 17.2% -7.8% 0.03 0.075 44% 1007
-8 30.0% 0.0% 0.04 0.054 49% 1007
-7 36.7% 2.8% 0.04 0.037 53% 1007
-6 34.8% 2.7% 0.04 0.023 53% 1007
-5 24.8% -9.2% 0.04 0.053 42% 1007
-4 30.8% -2.3% 0.04 0.037 47% 1007
-3 39.3% 0.4% 0.04 0.017 52% 1007
-2 53.3% 7.9% 0.04 0.005 56% 1007
-1 81.5% 21.9% 0.05 0.000 60% 1007
0 195.2% 116.5% 0.10 0.000 87% 681
1 69.7% 27.1% 0.05 0.005 62% 657
2 48.5% 6.9% 0.06 0.009 52% 620
3 42.3% 3.9% 0.05 0.011 52% 571
4 33.6% -0.8% 0.06 0.011 49% 447
5 29.5% -4.9% 0.06 0.009 47% 333
6 14.2% -8.2% 0.06 0.017 43% 238
7 14.9% -15.5% 0.07 0.011 42% 177
8 14.0% -15.8% 0.09 0.006 41% 135
9 21.0% -14.6% 0.10 0.005 42% 109
0 522.2% 383.2% 0.17 0.000 98% 1007
1 306.6% 205.8% 0.12 0.000 91% 1007
2 224.1% 139.2% 0.10 0.000 83% 1007
3 203.7% 119.4% 0.10 0.000 82% 1007
4 201.1% 108.9% 0.15 0.000 80% 1007
5 186.2% 96.3% 0.11 0.000 79% 1007
6 177.5% 94.2% 0.10 0.000 77% 1007
7 168.8% 90.2% 0.09 0.000 77% 1007
8 163.0% 78.4% 0.09 0.000 74% 1007




























































































































Table 4. Percentage Abnormal Turnover. The table presents the abnormal turnover computed 
following Brav and Heaton (1999) and Brav and Gompers (2003). The sample is composed of 
1,007  companies  involved  in  the  reform  process  form  April  2005  through  February  2007. 
Abnormal turnover is the percentage difference between actual turnover and normal turnover. 
Normal turnover for company i is defined as the mean daily turnover between ti -120 and ti -11 
where ti is the day of the first suspension. Turnover is the number of shares traded for a stock on 
a particular day. The periods considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after 
first suspension and ten days after the second readmission. The table presents the mean, the 
median,  the  standard  deviation,  the  bootstrap  p-value,  the  percentage  of  positive  abnormal 
turnover, and the number of observations. 
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Day MCAV
CLM 
variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     
variance      
t-stat
P-value
-10 0.02 4.13 10.35 0.02 0 0.08 40.46 19.85 0.00 0 0.11 56.56 28.26 0.00
-9 0.03 5.08 14.25 0.01 1 0.12 26.15 21.87 0.00 1 0.18 31.05 31.28 0.00
-8 0.06 7.66 21.87 0.00 2 0.16 21.92 22.37 0.00 2 0.23 27.91 32.77 0.00
-7 0.08 8.10 25.15 0.00 3 0.20 20.71 22.45 0.00 3 0.28 27.40 34.12 0.00
-6 0.10 9.20 29.88 0.00 4 0.22 16.60 19.95 0.00 4 0.33 26.55 34.84 0.00
-5 0.12 9.25 31.51 0.00 5 0.25 15.40 17.60 0.00 5 0.37 25.17 35.29 0.00
-4 0.14 9.57 34.35 0.00 6 0.26 11.70 14.21 0.00 6 0.41 24.87 36.22 0.00
-3 0.17 11.17 39.36 0.00 7 0.29 10.04 12.36 0.00 7 0.45 24.07 36.59 0.00
-2 0.20 12.72 44.41 0.00 8 0.33 9.52 11.48 0.00 8 0.49 23.15 36.81 0.00
-1 0.25 14.65 51.76 0.00 9 0.36 8.28 10.66 0.00 9 0.53 23.03 37.09 0.00
Before First Suspension Aftern First Suspension After Second Suspension
 
Table  5.  Abnormal  Volume  from  the  Ajinkya  and  Jian  (1989)  Model.  The  table  reports 
results of the mean cumulative and average abnormal volume analyses for the 1,007 companies 
included in the sample. The event study is performed on the residuals from the Ajinkya and Jian 
(1989) model. For each company involved in the stock reform process the model is estimated 
over a period including observations between ti-120 and ti -10, where ti is the day of the first 
suspension. The estimated parameters are used to compute the abnormal volumes over the event 
windows: 10 days before the first suspension, 10 days after the first suspension and 10 days after 
the second suspension. The estimated parameters are then used to compute the abnormal volume 
over the event windows. Abnormal volumes are summed to form cumulative abnormal volume 
and then averaged across companies to obtain the mean cumulative abnormal volume residuals 
(MCAV).  The  null  hypothesis  of  no  abnormal  volume  is  tested  under  the  assumption  of 
independence  across  abnormal  residuals  of  different  firms  following  Campbell,  Lo  and 
MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) and under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal 
residuals  (CS  variance)  see  Asquith  (1983)  and  Lynch  and  Mendenhall  (1997).  The  table 
presents  the  t-stat  for  all  the  procedures  as  well  as  bootstrap  p-values  obtained  from  the 









-10 4.6% -4.4% 0.02 0.281 45% 1007
-9 4.6% -7.0% 0.02 0.297 43% 1007
-8 11.7% -9.4% 0.02 0.269 42% 1007
-7 13.8% -0.5% 0.02 0.247 48% 1007
-6 8.4% -5.5% 0.02 0.240 43% 1007
-5 6.4% -7.5% 0.02 0.255 43% 1007
-4 12.3% -2.3% 0.02 0.232 47% 1007
-3 13.4% -3.6% 0.02 0.248 46% 1007
-2 15.3% 0.0% 0.02 0.231 49% 1007
-1 23.4% 4.1% 0.02 0.218 54% 1007
0 74.2% 55.9% 0.03 0.142 88% 681
1 14.6% 4.3% 0.02 0.232 53% 657
2 5.3% -9.0% 0.02 0.237 42% 620
3 1.5% -11.4% 0.02 0.228 39% 571
4 -5.5% -17.5% 0.02 0.525 35% 447
5 -5.5% -16.3% 0.02 0.633 38% 333
6 -6.2% -13.5% 0.03 0.722 35% 238
7 -10.1% -19.8% 0.03 0.798 31% 177
8 -6.6% -17.7% 0.04 0.822 32% 135
9 -12.3% -20.6% 0.03 0.864 30% 109
0 172.7% 131.8% 0.05 0.053 96% 1007
1 59.1% 38.2% 0.03 0.162 72% 1007
2 40.3% 17.7% 0.03 0.195 61% 1007
3 30.6% 12.8% 0.02 0.208 59% 1007
4 30.3% 11.2% 0.03 0.215 59% 1007
5 27.0% 7.6% 0.02 0.224 56% 1007
6 25.8% 6.4% 0.02 0.205 57% 1007
7 24.4% 3.5% 0.02 0.211 54% 1007
8 20.1% 2.7% 0.02 0.232 53% 1007




























































































































Table 6. Percentage Abnormal Price Range. The table presents the abnormal price range. The 
sample is composed of 1,007 companies involved in the reform process between April 2005 and 
February 2007. The abnormal price range is the percentage difference between the actual and the 
normal price range. The price range is defined as the percentage difference between the highest 
and the lowest price for a particular day. The normal price range is the mean daily price range 
between day ti -120 and day ti -11, where ti is the day of the first suspension. The periods 
considered are: ten days before the first suspension, ten days after first suspension, and ten days 
after the second readmission. The Table presents the mean, the median, the standard deviation, 
the  bootstrap  p-value,  the  percentage  of  positive  abnormal  price  range  and  the  number  of 
observations. 
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Change in prices (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Legal Person Shares -0.001 -0.001 -0.011 -0.008 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.015)
Concentration (ALL) -0.016 0.043 -0.034 -0.041 -0.018 -0.028
(0.012) (0.030) (0.037) (0.046) (0.038) (0.066)
Concentration (TSH) 0.002 -0.019 0.031 0.044 0.137** 0.163*
(0.006) (0.038) (0.040) (0.059) (0.066) (0.088)
Dummy B shares -0.436* 0.843 -1.768 (1.268) -1.097 -4.547**
(0.251) (1.109) (1.138) (1.715) (1.466) (2.172)
Earning to price -0.027 0.297 0.17 -0.69 -0.472 -2.179**
(0.047) (0.537) (0.568) (0.862) (0.770) (1.058)
Bid/Ask Spread 0.069 0.827 -0.343 2.51 0.105 2.555
(0.141) (1.853) (1.586) (2.566) (2.233) (2.891)
LnPastMarketValue -0.072* 1.271*** 0.363 0.744 -0.072 0.404
(0.038) (0.340) (0.409) (0.535) (0.464) (0.596)
% Tradable shares -1.659 0.304 -3.429 -5.041 -6.129 2.622
(1.077) (3.242) (3.303) (4.681) (4.245) (7.139)
Price Range 0.139*** 2.009*** (0.023) (0.087) 0.157** 1.485***
(0.046) (0.309) (0.093) (0.326) (0.075) (0.329)
Turnover 0.111* 0.510 0.453*** 1.821*** 0.610*** 1.785***
(0.058) (0.375) (0.114) (0.398) (0.096) (0.304)
Past Return -0.753** -0.691 0.068** 0.064
(0.354) (0.443) (0.035) (0.043)
Compensation 24.202*** 24.296** -4.131 3.392
(8.043) (9.671) (4.837) (6.950)
Dummy cash -7.575*** -6.547** -1.826 -2.000
(2.808) (2.944) (1.292) (1.762)
Constant 2.391* -17.409*** -3.505 -0.355 0.157 -16.550**
(1.241) (3.713) (4.448) (6.060) (5.130) (8.184)
Observations 997 997 672 672 997 997
R-sq 0.23 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.33 0.30
 
Table 7. Cross Sectional Analysis conducted on the Residuals from the Market Model. The 
table  presents  the  results  of  cross  sectional  analyses  where  the  independent  variables  are: 
speculation  variables  (turnover,  price  range  as  a  proxy  of  current  volatility,  lagged  returns), 
structural  variables  (earnings-to-price,  size),  governance  variables  (the  percentage  of  legal 
shares, a dummy for B shares, and various concentration variables), reform-specific variables (a 
dummy equal to 1 for companies giving cash compensation, compensation). The cross section is 
run six times, to explain the change in prices (i) days between august 2005 and ten days before 
the  first  suspension,  (ii)  ten  days  before  the  first  suspension  (iii)  on  the  day  of  the  first 
readmission, (iv) between the first readmission and the second suspension, (v) on the day of the 
second  readmission  and  (vi)  ten  days  after  the  second  readmission.  Abnormal  returns  are 
obtained  from  the  market  model.  Robust  Standard  Errors  are  reported  in  parentheses. 
Significance levels are denoted by (*) for 10 percent, (**) for 5 percent and (***) for 1 percent. 
   36 
Panel A: From January 1998 to January 2005
CHSCOMP CHZCOMP Market Size Floating Liquidity
CHSCOMP 0.975 0.987 0.142 0.030 -0.010
CHZCOMP 0.990 0.208 0.109 -0.032




mean 0.00% -0.01% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% -0.01%
median 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00%
Minimum -8.73% -8.68% -8.96% -3.36% -2.69% -1.64%
Maximum 9.40% 9.24% 8.95% 2.68% 2.54% 1.69%
Annual St.Dev. 22.24 23.53 23.01 8.96 5.81 4.61
Annual Return 1.01% -3.37% 1.07% 10.14% 0.09% -1.42%
Total Performance 5.97% -21.79% 5.94% 94.13% -0.38% -9.87%
Panel B: From January 2005 to February 2007
CHSCOMP CHZCOMP Market Size Floating Liquidity
CHSCOMP 0.927 0.941 -0.022 0.168 0.028
CHZCOMP 0.987 0.150 0.353 -0.009




mean 0.16% 0.16% 0.15% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02%
median 0.14% 0.25% 0.21% -0.01% -0.02% -0.01%
Minimum -9.26% -8.93% -10.27% -2.46% -1.99% -1.34%
Maximum 7.89% 7.62% 7.48% 3.16% 2.15% 0.81%
Annual St.Dev. 24.16 25.41 25.69 12.58 7.16 4.65
Annual Return 39.67% 40.89% 38.02% -3.32% -5.25% -5.86%
Total Performance 131.83% 137.21% 123.25% -8.56% -11.16% -11.81%
 
Table 8. Risk Factors. The table contains summary statistics about the risk factors. The factors 
are: the Shanghai Composite market index, the Shenzhen Composite market index, our float-
weighted market index, a size portfolio, a floating ratio portfolio, a liquidity portfolio, and a Pre-
Post portfolio. Panel A reports correlations and summary statistics (mean, median, minimum, 
maximum, standard deviation, total performance) over the period 1998-2005. The data refer to 
daily percentage returns except for the total performance which refers to the return over the 
whole sub-sample. Panel B reports correlations and summary statistics over the period 2005 -




variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     




variance      
t-stat
CS     
variance      
t-stat
P-value
-10 0.10 1.43 3.38 0.20 0 0.51 3.29 1.95 0.00 0 0.42 2.70 1.05 0.02
-9 0.12 1.08 3.01 0.25 1 0.36 1.98 1.17 0.08 1 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 0.42
-8 0.32 2.30 6.43 0.19 2 0.52 2.58 1.52 0.07 2 -0.32 -1.72 -0.76 0.87
-7 0.45 2.84 7.95 0.16 3 0.79 3.61 2.25 0.04 3 -0.43 -2.15 -1.01 0.90
-6 0.57 3.19 8.97 0.14 4 1.05 4.43 2.87 0.02 4 -0.48 -2.22 -1.09 0.90
-5 0.65 3.27 9.22 0.12 5 1.23 4.90 3.27 0.01 5 -0.57 -2.46 -1.28 0.92
-4 0.83 4.00 10.95 0.09 6 1.35 5.17 3.50 0.01 6 -0.50 -2.03 -1.11 0.83
-3 1.25 5.77 15.52 0.05 7 1.48 5.61 3.85 0.00 7 -0.51 -1.96 -1.11 0.82
-2 1.82 7.69 21.20 0.00 8 1.59 5.94 4.11 0.00 8 -0.33 -1.22 -0.71 0.59
-1 2.74 10.43 30.29 0.00 9 1.65 6.07 4.20 0.00 9 -0.47 -1.64 -1.00 0.69
Aftern First Suspension After Second Suspension Before First Suspension
 
Table 9. Event Study Conducted on the Residuals from the Wang-Xu Model with Liquidity 
Replicating  Portfolio.  The  table  reports  mean  cumulative  abnormal  returns  for  the  1,007 
companies included in the sample. The event study is performed on the residuals from a factor 
model including the market, size, float and liquidity. For company i the model is estimated over 
a  period  including  observation  between  ti  -120  and  ti  -10  where  ti  is  the  day  of  the  first 
suspension. The estimated parameters are used to compute the abnormal returns over the event 
windows: 10 days before the first suspension, 10 days after the first suspension and 10 days after 
the  second  suspension.  Abnormal  returns  are  summed  to  form  cumulative  abnormal  returns 
(CAR).  CARs  are  then  averaged  across  companies  to  obtain  the  mean cumulative  abnormal 
residuals (MCAR). The null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is tested under the assumption of 
independence  across  abnormal  residuals  of  different  firms  following  Campbell,  Lo  and 
MacKinlay (1997) (CLM variance) and under the assumption of no correlation across abnormal 
residuals  (CS  variance)  see  Asquith  (1983)  and  Lynch  and  Mendenhall  (1997).  The  table 
presents  the  t-stat  for  all  the  procedures  as  well  as  bootstrap  p-values  obtained  from  the 
methodology described in the text. 
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Change in prices (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Legal Person Shares -0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.007 -0.004 0
(0.001) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.015)
Concentration (ALL) 0.001 0.022 0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.013
(0.003) (0.028) (0.042) (0.058) (0.045) (0.063)
Concentration (TSH) -0.002 -0.015 0.038 0.03 0.027 0.022
(0.003) (0.039) (0.045) (0.065) (0.072) (0.099)
Dummy B shares (0.095) 0.841 -0.862 0.459 -0.685 -4.027*
(0.086) (1.129) (1.206) (1.790) (1.545) (2.127)
Earning to price -0.057 0.446 -0.168 0.212 0.569 -0.368
(0.047) (0.590) (0.868) (1.128) (0.731) (1.006)
Bid/Ask Spread 0.088 -0.718 -0.925 4.299 -1.549 1.581
(0.129) (1.878) (1.990) (2.652) (2.278) (2.988)
LnPastMarketValue 0.019 0.362 -0.024 0.19 -0.072 0.007
(0.039) (0.320) (0.456) (0.548) (0.489) (0.618)
% Tradable shares -0.228 -1.129 2.158 -0.32 -7.551 0.927
(0.328) (3.010) (4.120) (5.975) (5.137) (7.003)
Price Range 0.097** 2.108*** (0.063) (0.032) 0.203*** 1.774***
(0.043) (0.284) (0.108) (0.360) (0.072) (0.314)
Turnover 0.106* 0.469 0.363** 1.419*** 0.624*** 1.608***
(0.062) (0.357) (0.143) (0.466) (0.101) (0.315)
Past Return -0.945 -1.890** 0.121*** 0.159***
(0.707) (0.861) (0.033) (0.047)
Compensation 27.377*** 27.919*** -9.881* -3.978
(7.408) (9.014) (5.370) (6.967)
Dummy cash -8.754*** -7.419** -1.578 -1.311
(2.833) (3.075) (1.390) (1.854)
Constant 0.122 -10.788*** -5.927 -7.462 -2.3 -18.806**
(0.416) (3.385) (5.483) (7.433) (5.798) (7.868)
Observations 997 997 672 672 997 997
R-sq 0.15 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.36 0.32
 
Table 10. Cross Sectional Analysis conducted on residuals from the Wang-Xu Model with 
Liquidity Replicating Portfolio. The table presents the results of cross sectional analyses where 
the independent variables are: speculation variables (turnover, price range as a proxy of current 
volatility, past returns), structural variables (earnings-to-price, size), governance variables (the 
percentage of legal shares, a dummy for B shares, and various concentration variables), reform-
specific variables (a dummy equal to 1 for companies giving cash compensation, compensation). 
The cross section six times, to explain the change in prices (i) days between august 2005 and ten 
days before the first suspension, (ii) ten days before the first suspension (iii) on the day of the 
first readmission, (iv) between the first readmission and the second suspension, (v) on the day of 
the second readmission and (vi) ten days after the second readmission. Abnormal returns are 
obtained from the Wang-Xu model with liquidity-replicating portfolio and the pre minus after 
portfolio. Robust Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are denoted by 
(*) for 10 percent, (**) for 5 percent and (***) for 1 percent. 






















-10 0.524 0.533 0.580 0 0.017 0.015 0.020 0 0.106 0.118 0.104
-9 0.449 0.458 0.477 1 0.147 0.147 0.149 1 0.533 0.526 0.591
-8 0.347 0.385 0.393 2 0.112 0.138 0.144 2 0.681 0.712 0.729
-7 0.353 0.360 0.395 3 0.066 0.080 0.075 3 0.713 0.747 0.754
-6 0.366 0.369 0.383 4 0.049 0.053 0.061 4 0.700 0.727 0.728
-5 0.416 0.452 0.445 5 0.027 0.023 0.042 5 0.714 0.716 0.733
-4 0.382 0.412 0.399 6 0.011 0.014 0.029 6 0.687 0.695 0.702
-3 0.295 0.327 0.295 7 0.005 0.008 0.022 7 0.684 0.703 0.704
-2 0.103 0.104 0.138 8 0.004 0.009 0.016 8 0.648 0.668 0.667
-1 0.008 0.016 0.050 9 0.003 0.008 0.018 9 0.653 0.688 0.687
After Second Suspension Before First Suspension Aftern First Suspension
 
Table 11. Bootstrap robustness. The table reports p-values for our event study obtained by 
residuals estimated over three alternatives bootstrap estimation period of 140 days, 250 days and 





























Figure 1. Batches of Companies. The figure reports the timing of the various batches and the 






































Figure 2. Baotou Huazi International Price. The figure shows the price for Baotou Huazi 
International during the reform process.    42 































Figure 3. Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The figure reports result of the MCAR analysis 
for the 1,007 companies included in our sample and their 95% confidence interval. Residuals are 
computed from the market model. The cumulative residuals are computed starting ten days before 
the beginning of the reform process. The first interval (referred to as “before first suspension” in the 
picture) covers ten days before the first suspension. The second interval (“after first suspension”) 
covers ten days after the first readmission. The third interval (“after second readmission”) covers 
ten days after the second readmissios.  
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Figure 4. Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The figure reports result of the MCAR analysis 
for the 1,007 companies included in our sample and their 95% confidence interval for the 90-day 
period before the first suspension. Residuals are computed from the market model. The cumulative 







































































Figure 5. Daily Turnover. The figure reports the daily total turnover (million of shares traded on a 
given day) of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets between March 2004 and February 2007. 
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